at Minneapolis Community and Technical College, was walking to the grocery store with friends when a group of patrons smoking outside the Schooner Tavern lanced racist and transphobic taunts in their direction. 2 As the conflict escalated, the attackers included Dean Schmitz; his ex-girlfriend, Molly Flaherty; and Jenny Thoreson, Schmitz's current girlfriend. Flaherty threw a drink, then broke a beer glass in McDonald's face, leaving her with lacerations to the left cheek deep enough to cut a saliva gland. Schmitz jumped in to join the assault, and McDonald, surrounded, grabbed a pair of scissors from her purse and stabbed him in the chest, puncturing the right ventricle of his heart.
McDonald-who flagged police to the scene herself-was immediately arrested. She was shackled to her hospital bed while getting stitches in her cheek, then charged with two counts of seconddegree murder. Despite her plea of self-defense and the credible threat she faced, McDonald was brought to trial and eventually accepted a plea deal with a forty-one-month sentence. She remained in a Minnesota men's correctional facility for two and a half years.
3
A dedicated activist and analyst, McDonald penned a moving letter from her cell, reflecting on the racial and gender injustice evident in the Zimmerman verdict. While she acknowledges the parallels and asymmetries between her case and Zimmerman's, she also gently discourages supporters from painting her as a particularly persecuted victim of the criminal justice system. "I know that people have been comparing my case to Zimmerman's, and yes it's obvious that laws are biased,"
she writes. "But even I can say I came out blessed knowing that (a) the system was against me to begin with, and that (b) looking at other cases similar to mines [sic], I didn't have to spent [sic] extensive time-even decades-in prison. People don't understand that I actually feel a guilt for that. . . . I can say that survivor's guilt is real." 4 Her survivor's guilt, as she goes on to describe it, is not only for surviving the criminal justice system relatively intact. More to the point, it comes from having survived the June 2011 attack at all, when so many other black, queer, and transgender people die in assaults like the one in front of the Schooner. If racism, as Ruth Gilmore famously defines it, is characterized by "the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death," 5 then what words can we find to explain the kind of racist transphobia that leaves a twenty-five-year-old black woman feeling guilty for having survived so long-guilty for having cheated premature death for nine years after her transition?
This is not for us a rhetorical question, but neither is it one we would attempt to answer in so short an article. Instead, we want to use this space to think about how we might approach this question-to strategize methodologies for theorizing the intersection of racism and transphobia.
In his work on gender queerness, Jack Halberstam has developed a generative "scavenger methodology" that collects, deconstructs, and recombines a variety of cross-disciplinary methods in order to "produce information on subjects who have been deliberately or accidentally excluded Zavawn "Zay" Smith, and Roneal Harris-had been barbecuing in the yard of their apartment complex, and, just before midnight, they decided to stroll over to Cub Foods to get something else to eat. As they approached Lake Street, they were stopped by the catcalls from the Schooner that would become the beginning of the attack against them. In police interviews, Thoreson said she didn't remember exactly what she and others called out, only that it was something "derogatory" and "sarcastic": "They were very feminine guys," she said, "something about their walk." Flaherty claimed no memory of what she said at all, only that one of the passersby "was wearing booty shorts and a tank top . . . [and] looked like he was ready to go to a recital." Thomas's recall, in his police interview, was much more specific: "[They said,] 'Oh you faggots, you nigger lovers, and whoop-de-woo, you ain't nothing but a bunch of nigger babies.' . . . So as they said all that, I go over there and talk to [Schmitz] How could any man who knows the pleasure of owning ever-subservient slaves settle for a masculine, assertive wife? If "natural" laws are crossed such that women can become men or men can "degenerate" into women, well, then, the imperial epistemology that strictly separates humans into two categories-those naturally dominated and those who naturally dominate-shatters like a glass on concrete. Transphobia becomes as necessary to the logic of chattel slavery as the fear of the racial hybrid.
In this white supremacist patriarchal gender system, the category of womanhood-like that of blackness-is especially policed, Dayan points out: "What happened to women in this conten- Fanon's "Look, a Negro" together form an expectation of extrahumiliation and death for women like
McDonald. 11 That is, an expectation that a transwoman on a street where males and females are "supposed" to be immediately and recognizably distinct, that a black person in a northern city that is "supposed" to be white, has to be violently herded back inside strict lines that divide sexes and races-an expectation that leads to the conclusion that because McDonald cannot be etherealized by Schmitz and his friend, she must be brutalized.
"Slavery," Saidiya Hartman writes, "established a measure of man and a ranking of life that has yet to be undone." 12 McDonald's attack and Dayan's analysis do more than reiterate the slaveryinspired ranking of life that Hartman describes. They underscore that the "measure of man" she writes of is, in fact, a gendered one, in which white cisgender masculinity measures itself simultaneously against gendered, sexualized, and racialized others. On 5 June 2011, this meant that law enforcement measured Dean Schmitz against CeCe McDonald and found the former more deserving of life than the latter. When the police arrived on the scene of the Lake Street attack and saw two injured individuals-a white cisgender man and a black transwoman-"it wasn't hard for them to assume who the aggressors were," as McDonald writes on her blog. Schmitz was immediately put into an ambulance while McDonald was seated "in the back of a squad car in handcuffs while bleeding badly and in very bad pain," then finally transported to a hospital where she was interrogated, shackled to her bed, then treated. 13 to contrast the 'punishment of death and stripes' for slaves with the separate system for criminals, implying that the unique deprivation fixed in the mind was crueler than corporal discipline" (65).
Dayan goes further to suggest that, in fact, these two forms of punishment may be intimately linked.
"Slavery in the United States brought about a new understanding of the limits of human endurance,"
she writes, "so that new, more refined cruelties could be invented" (57). That is, having learned from eighteenth-and nineteenth-century slave rebellions that corporeal tortures alone could not break human beings, jailers pioneered new, psychic forms of debilitation in the prisons where the enslaved and their descendants would be disproportionately detained.
The logic undergirding the routine use of solitary confinement for transgender inmates, however, owes even more than this to the systematized depersonalization attempted by chattel slavery. If we can read through Dayan's early work to theorize how and why racism is imbricated with transphobia, we can also read through her recent work to theorize how transphobia is imbricated with racism in the prison system and beyond. After initial placement in "administrative isolation,"
McDonald was summoned before a committee of prison health officials and wardens to determine, first, her gender, and, second, whether she would continue to be housed in solitary confinement.
Minneapolis activist Katie Burgess describes this process as a "remarkably abusive" examination that considers three factors: "physiology-meaning your genitals," sexual practices, and prior placement. McDonald was declared male and returned to administrative isolation. 22 Arrest makes it possible for her to be stripped of her right to determine her own gender because, as Dayan writes, "the prisoner lacks the right to himself" (57)-or in McDonald's case, herself. This lack of a right to one's self is an aspect of felons' civil death-the state of a person who though biologically alive "has lost all civil rights" (58)-that Dayan describes in terms of its outgrowth from the social death of the enslaved. That is, the incarcerated could be recognized as undeserving of full personhood because slave codes provided legal precedent for recognizing certain people as less than human, a kind of living dead.
According to Orlando Patterson's comparative study Slavery and Social Death, "social death"
is the condition of the slave's alienation from the rest of society that characterizes chattel slavery.
This alienation includes coercion through violent and direct force, the loss of any "legally enforceable" ties of family, the withholding of independent social existence except through the master, permanent degradation, "pervasive indignity . . . [and] endless personal violation." 23 As Matt
Richardson has argued elsewhere, another component to the indignity, cruelty, and violation of slavery is the master's power to define gender parameters, to limit slaves' gendered self-expression through a variety of means including forced work, sexual subjugation, and the general control over every aspect of the slaves' physical being. 24 Denial of gender self-definition as part of transgender inmates' civil death, then, is a "natural" extension of the denial of gender self-definition codified in black social death: where chattel slavery refuses the socially dead the right to determine their own gender, the prison system extends this refusal to the civilly dead. McDonald's body, as it "fails" its gender examination, undergoes a type of extra violence designed to keep its pathology (read, determination for self-making) from spreading to the other prisoners-lest they, too, demand some self-defense is a punishable act. Even as she places herself in a genealogy of wronged and incarcerated womanhood, she also connects with definitions of gender that celebrate its fluidity. Quoting an Illinois newsletter, she writes that "Gender is NOT" defined by anatomy or "chromosomes" or restricted to "male and female"; it is a "personal identity" and is determined by how "you relate to 
